Brief History of the Soul, ch. 6

This chapter seeks to address the issues brought up by science in general and naturalism in specific. this is ultimately an issue of methodology. Naturalists make epistemological and philosophical claims that are outside of their field of study. This chapter really draws off of the previous trying to demonstrate the difference between a physical event and a property (like pain). What is most helpful for me is their distinction between a physical action on our bodies; lets say me pushing on part of your brain to cause you to curse, and you choosing (by mental/soul choice) to curse. Both result in the same physical activity of sounds resonating through your vocal chords rubbing together after the firing of certain brain neurons. However, they are different in that one can be a physical act (me pushing on a part of the brain) and you choosing. There is no need to assume that because one can happen that all events must be because of a similar action. I don't think that I expressed the point as clearly as Goetz and Taliaferro, but that get's the gist.