Brief History of the Soul, ch. 3

This chapter takes up the soul in Continental Thought, dealing primarily with Descartes and Leibniz. Descartes maintains, which I agree, that the "I" is the soul and that "I" is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is even if the body did not exist. This seems evident to me. The soul seems to be a substance that has a body, like an apple has color. In one sense, it is necessary and in other not. Still working all of this out (which is why we are reading these books). I have to admit, I have a series of question marks throughout the reading from here. I appreciate Descartes' (and Plantinga's) argument that the soul is properly basic. I feel as if there must be something even more basic in the soul than the thinking. I can think of parts of the soul such as thinking, feeling, memory, desire, etc. If I lose any combination of these things (like an Alzheimer's patient who had a lobotomy), I would want to maintain there is still a soul. Further, it is not as if I cease to exist if I am sleeping or in a coma. So, there seems to be a sense in which thinking (in terms of consciousness) is not required for existence. However, we know we exist through consciousness (in keeping with Descartes).